A Differential Stackelberg Game Theoretic Model of the Promotion of Innovations in Universities

Authors

  • Mukharbek Malsagov Ingush State University
  • Gennady Ougolnitsky Southern Federal University
  • Anatoly Usov Southern Federal University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.25728/assa.2020.20.3.977

Keywords:

Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium, Stackelberg differential games, innovations, method of qualitatively representative scenarios in simulation modeling

Abstract

A two-level dynamical game theoretic model "federal state - universities" in open-loop strategies is built and investigated. A refinement of the electronic learning courses, and their differentiation using modern methods of information technologies made by competing a la Cournot universities (agents) are treated as innovative investments. The algorithms of building Nash (in the non-coalitional game of agents) and Stackelberg (in the hierarchical game of the Principal with the grand coalition of agents) equilibria are proposed and implemented. For the solution of the respective dynamic control problems the Pontryagin maximum principle and simulation modeling are used. A comprehensive analysis of the received results is given.

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Published

2020-09-30

How to Cite

Malsagov, M., Ougolnitsky, G., & Usov, A. (2020). A Differential Stackelberg Game Theoretic Model of the Promotion of Innovations in Universities. Advances in Systems Science and Applications, 20(3), 166–177. https://doi.org/10.25728/assa.2020.20.3.977

Issue

Vol. 20 No. 3 (2020): Advances in Systems Science and Applications

Section

Articles