Game-Theoretic Models of Quality Management in Organizations under Corruption

Main Article Content

Makka Agieva
Movlatkhan Agieva
Gennady Ougolnitsky


We consider game theoretic models of the quality management in an organizational system under corruption. A graph theoretic formalization of the process approach in quality management is proposed. In a static case, a problem of quality management in a two-level organizational system under corruption is formalized as an inverse Stackelberg game with an additional viability condition. It is solved by means of Germeier theorem. In a three-level model we analyze how the Principal can constraint corruption by penalties. The conditions under which the Principal rather supports corruption than constraints it are determined. In a dynamic case, a quality indicator is considered as a state variable which changes in a discrete time due to an equation of dynamics. A two-level model of the type "supervisor-agent" is studied first. It is assumed that a quality requirement is obligatory for the agent but he can weaken this requirement in exchange for a bribe to the supervisor. Then we build and analyze a three-level model by adding the Principal that can charge penalties to other players if a bribe is found. The game theoretic models are investigated numerically by means of simulation modeling.


Download data is not yet available.

Article Details

How to Cite
Agieva, M., Agieva, M., & Ougolnitsky, G. (2024). Game-Theoretic Models of Quality Management in Organizations under Corruption. Advances in Systems Science and Applications, 24(1), 95-113.