Models of adaptation in dynamical contracts under stochastic uncertainty

Authors

  • Mikhail V. Belov IBS
  • Dmitry A. Novikov Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.25728/assa.2018.18.1.540

Keywords:

contract theory, incentive problem, stochastic uncertainty, adaptive behavior

Abstract

In this paper, we establish new sufficient conditions for the optimality of lump-sum and compensatory incentive schemes (contracts) under stochastic uncertainty. In addition, we suggest and analyze dynamical models of principal’s and agents’ adaptation to changes in statistical characteristics of an external environment. 

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Published

2018-05-25

Issue

Vol. 18 No. 1 (2018)

Section

Translated articles

How to Cite

Models of adaptation in dynamical contracts under stochastic uncertainty. (2018). Advances in Systems Science and Applications, 18(1), 110-131. https://doi.org/10.25728/assa.2018.18.1.540