Models of adaptation in dynamical contracts under stochastic uncertainty
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.25728/assa.2018.18.1.540Keywords:
contract theory, incentive problem, stochastic uncertainty, adaptive behaviorAbstract
In this paper, we establish new sufficient conditions for the optimality of lump-sum and compensatory incentive schemes (contracts) under stochastic uncertainty. In addition, we suggest and analyze dynamical models of principal’s and agents’ adaptation to changes in statistical characteristics of an external environment.
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Published
2018-05-25
How to Cite
Belov, M. V., & Novikov, D. A. (2018). Models of adaptation in dynamical contracts under stochastic uncertainty. Advances in Systems Science and Applications, 18(1), 110–131. https://doi.org/10.25728/assa.2018.18.1.540
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